More sociological than the sociologists : undisciplined and undiscplinary thinking about society and modernity in the nineteenth century by Arni, Caroline & Müller, Charlotte
  
 
 
 
 Institutional Repository of the University of Basel 
 University Library 
 Schoenbeinstrasse 18-20 
 CH-4056 Basel, Switzerland 
 http://edoc.unibas.ch/ 
  
 
 
Year: 2004 
 
 
More sociological than the sociologists : undisciplined and 
undiscplinary thinking about society and modernity in the nineteenth 
century 
Arni, Caroline and Müller, Charlotte 
 
 
 
 
 
Posted at edoc, University of Basel 
Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A5256449 
 
Originally published as: 
Arni, Caroline and Müller, Charlotte. (2004) More sociological than the sociologists : undisciplined and 
undiscplinary thinking about society and modernity in the nineteenth century. In: Engendering the social. 
Maidenhead, S. 71-98. 
 
© 2004. Reproduced with the kind permission of Open University Press. All rights reserved. 
r 
i 
Engendering the 
social 
Feminist encounters with 
sociological theory 
Edited by 
Barbara L. Marshall and Anne Witz 
Open University Press 
4 More sociological than the 
sociologists? Undisciplined and 
undisciplinary thinking about 
society and modernity in the 
nineteenth century 
Caroline Arni and'Charlotte Muller 
The gendering of modernity as a masculine 'affair' structures and organizes 
discourses on modern society from their very beginnings. In this chapter, we 
present two social thinkers of the nineteenth century who entered neither the 
sociological tradition nor the history of the discipline, and who were excluded 
not only for being women, but also for contesting the organizing principles of 
emerging sociological discourse. Both Harriet Martineau (1802-76) and Jenny 
P. d'Hericourt (1809-75) pursued a genuine feminist interest when they ana-
lysed the exclusion of women from 'modern society1 as a social, not a natural, 
fact and made gender a category of analysis. And in doing so, they widened the 
analytical scope of the discourse on society before it gained its form as a mascu-
linized discipline. Our interest in Martineau and d'Hericourt goes beyond 
exposing the singularity of two particular women. The aim of this chapter is to 
analyse the gendering of modernity through emerging discourses of the 
'social' and to draw attention to the way in which, from the very outset, femin-
ists contested the masculine character of these discourses. 
Gender as a category of social circumstances: Harriet 
Martineau and the analysis of modern societies 
If a test of civilisation be sought, none can be so sure as the condition 
of that half of society over which the other half has power ... The 
Americans have, in the treatment of women, fallen below, not only 
their own democratic principles, but the practice of some parts of the 
Old World. 
(Martineau 1837: 156) 
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The Englishwoman Harriet Martineau (1802-76) might be seen as the 'first 
sociologist' (Rossi 1973) given that she not only astutely analysed modern 
society as it was developing, but was also a successfully published, feminist 
social scientist. Martineau, who from the 1830s was able to live on the royal-
ties from her publications, was an extremely versatile and productive author 
who worked in diverse fields and formed opinions in disparate disciplines: of 
particular note here are her religious papers and papers which criticize religion 
(for example, Martineau 1822; 1830), her educational advice (for example, 
Martineau 1849), her historical writings (for example, Martineau 1849-50), 
her political statements and comments (for example her contributions in the 
London Daily News between 1852 and 1866) or her literary essays aimed at both 
adults (for example, 1839) and children (for example, 1841). But it is her 
extensive sociological works that allow us to distinguish her from other suc-
cessful nineteenth-century female authors, for it is here that she produced 
writings that pose genuine sociological questions and spark empirical research. 
Posing the question of how societies can be analysed and understood ([1838] 
1989) led her to develop an original method and set up methodological prin-
ciples to govern research into social reality. She did not stop at simply reflect-
ing on research strategies, however, but applied these empirically to actual 
societies asking, for example, what is the relationship between theory - the 
promises of equality- and practice in American society (1837)? Elsewhere -in 
a cross-cultural comparative study- she looked at socio-historical and religious 
lines of societal development (Martineau 1848). In these works she always 
connected micro and macro sociological perspectives. For example, while 
micro sociological field studies shed light on the reality of life for women 
servants (Martineau 1838-9), Martineau recognized the ubiquity of unequal 
social relationships such as those of class, sex and race which framed them. 
Thus, contrary to the position taken by those recognized in the mainstream as 
the 'founding fathers' of sociology, inequality is not principally or solely the 
expression of class relationships, to which further inequalities, such as the 
relationship between the sexes, is subordinate or even naturalized. For 
Martineau, social antinomies are grounded in the relational 'circumstances' of 
individuals, and not in their psycho-physical, biologically determined disposi-
tions. She explicitly criticized the insistence of her contemporaries on the 'all-
pervading power of natural predispositions' as speculative, going against the 
ideas of the Enlightenment and progress and, due to its typifying effect, as an 
ideological instrument to ensure patriarchal hegemony. In her sociological 
writings she investigated the background to these 'circumstances', the con-
sequences of different socialization processes and a politics of inequality 
derived from self-interest. As we will show, Martineau developed a consistently 
sociological approach in her writings, and even in the early stages of the dis-
cipline of sociology as we now know it, she generated central sociological 
concepts which remain valid today. 
MORE SOCIOLOGICAL THAN THE SOCIOLOGISTS? 73 
Biography and publication 
Authorship has never been with me a matter of choice. I have not 
done it for amusement, or for money, or for fame, or for any reason 
but because I could not help it. Things were pressing to be said; and 
there was more or less evidence that I was the person to say them. 
(Martineau 1877: vol. I, p. 188) 
Harriet Martineau, born 1802 in Norwich, is a 'typical daughter' of the Age of 
Enlightenment which, in England, was predominantly characterized by the 
concepts of utilitarianism and deism. Belonging to a quite liberal and tolerant 
middle-class English family, brought up as a Unitarian, she received a remark-
able education even in subjects that were not typically taught to women. 1 A 
sickly child, she was mainly taught at home by her elder brothers and sisters. 
Supplementing this 'unformalized formal' education with an intense self-
study of several economic, political and theological theories, she was able to 
acquire a relatively diverse and extensive knowledge. Her father's occupation 
as a manufacturer meant that Martineau had a fairly comfortable childhood. 
After his death in the 1820s the family became impoverished and Harriet 
Martineau was left to rely on her own resources. At this time she started writ-
ing and publishing: first novels and stories. 
Her transformation into an author who was respected in broad circles 
came with the publication of her popular writings on economics: Illustrations 
of Political Economy (1832-4), and subsequent works, prompted by politi-
cians, on the revision of the poor law (1833-4) and the revision of taxation 
law (1834). Her decision to make the 'laws' of political economy, which 
formed the theoretical frame of reference for her middle-class lifestyle (at 
least until her father was ruined as a manufacturer), accessible to the 
uneducated classes was rooted in the direct observation of social tensions in 
the wake of crude, boom and bust Manchester capitalism, as well as in her 
own understanding of the writings of Jane Marcet (Martineau 1877: vol. I, 
p. 138) who, in the early years of the nineteenth century, produced a much 
respected essay in the form of a mother-daughter dialogue which addressed 
questions of political economy (Marcet 1816). In her Illustrations, Martineau 
gives us well-founded, didactically constructed short stories. The plot around 
which she wove her historical and internationally based stories was taken 
directly from the works of the political economists - Smith, Bentham, 
Ricardo, Malthus and John Stuart Mill. She packaged their central ideas (the 
utilitarian principle of the maximum benefit or the 'holy dogma' of the 
'greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people') in short 
stories on subjects such as the principles of political economy, capital and 
labour, population growth, finance and free trade, as well as addressing the 
poor laws and taxation law (Escher 1925; Orazem 1999). Her interest as a 
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didact and communicator was at the forefront, as a broadening rather than a 
(critical) deepening of an enlightened education. Despite a negative prog-
nosis for the success of her plans (Martineau 1877: vol. I, p. 169), Martineau 
made a commercial breakthrough with her fllustrations (Hoecker-Drysdale 
1992: 33£). Her uncritical attitude to the core tenets of political economy 
brought her lasting recognition among broad sections of the population, 
including the political classes and contemporary authors in political 
economy. The acid-tongued critic of political economy, Karl Marx, clearly pre-
ferred to ignore her contributions by pouring his biting scorn on her in a 
brief aside (Marx 1975: 664). 
After completion of illustrations, Harriet Martineau decided to take an 
enjoyable and relaxing journey to America. En route she started to pull 
together methodically reflected ideas about 'how to observe' any society. She 
spent two years in America, where she tested her empirically orientated ideas. 
On her return from the United States she reported her observations in Society in 
America (1837) and in a shortened, more popular version in Retrospect of 
Western Travel (1838). In the same year, she published her principles and 
methods of empirical social research in How to Observe Morals and Manners 
([1838] 1989). 
In 1851 she began a translation of Auguste Comte's Cours de philosophie 
positive, aiming to win recognition for Comte's ideas. Following on from her 
earlier project, of popularizing the theories of the political economists and 
thereby enlightening broad sweeps of English society on the conditions and 
laws of societal development, the systematic grounding of science in the Cours 
de philosophie positive appeared to her to be the appropriate, and ultimately 
unique, correct answer to the increasing differentiation of sciences, which 
ought to be made accessible to an interested public - in the service of 
enlightenment: 
We are living in a remarkable time, when the conflict of opinions 
renders a firm foundation of knowledge indispensable, not only to 
our intellectual, moral, and social progress, but to our holding such 
ground as we have gained from former ages. While our science is split 
up into arbitrary divisions; while abstract and concrete science are 
confounded together, and even mixed up with their application to 
the arts, and with natural history; and while the researchers of the 
scientific world are presented as mere accretions to a heterogeneous 
mass of facts, there can be no hope of a scientific progress which shall 
satisfy and benefit those large classes of students whose business it is, 
not to explore, but to receive. The growth of a scientific taste among 
the working classes of this country is one of the most striking of the 
signs of the times. I believe no one can inquire into the mode of life of 
young men of the middle and operative classes without being struck 
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with the desire that is shown, and the sacrifices that are made, to 
obtain the means of scientific study. 
(Martineau 1853: VII) 
Comte's work seemed to her to be too long-winded in its exposition and 
too heavy duty in its language and 'overloaded with words' (Martineau 1853: 
VI). To achieve a broader acceptance of the work, she decided to condense the 
original into two volumes. This interpretive achievement was such a success 
that Comte preferred the English edition to his own French version, and used 
it as the basis for a revised edition (von Petzold 1941: 43). Above all, Comte 
himself praised her abridgement and assured her that he felt 'sure that your 
name will be linked with mine, for you have executed the only one of those 
works that will survive among all those which my fundamental treatise has 
called forth' (Comte, cited in Hill 1989: xlvii). Nevertheless, this achievement, 
which was expressly acknowledged by the 'founding father' of sociology, was 
not enough to secure her a place in this developing discipline. 
Martineau died in 1876. In her home town of Norwich, a place where 
history and tradition are otherwise very important and where other significant 
people lived, there is no longer anything to remind us of her. On the house in 
which she spent her childhood there is, however, a small plaque which reads: 
'James Martineau (1805-1900), Unitarian philosopher and teacher was born in 
this house and spent his boyhood here'. James was Harriet Martineau's 
younger brother, her self-confessed favourite. 
'Though the facts sought by travellers relate to Persons, they may most 
readily be learned from Things' - moral and methodical conditions in 
observing a society 
Until now, sociologists have been little concerned with characterising 
and defining the methods they use to examine social phenomena ... 
A chapter of Cours de philosophie positive is almost the only original 
and important treatise there is. 
(Emile Durkheim 1895: 103) 
If Monsieur Durkheim views the chapter of Comte's Cours de philosophie posi-
tive as being 'almost' the only original and important treatise on methodical 
questions, of whom else was he thinking when he said 'almost'? It was cer-
tainly not Harriet Martineau, although he could (and surely should) have 
known her. Her 'freely translated and condensed' edition of The Positive 
Philosophy of Auguste Comte (1853) gained some recognition at least, even in 
France. However, the promised 'link', of which Comte had spoken, was not 
strong enough. In his considerations on how to observe social phenomena, 
Durkheim wrote much about Comte and Spencer but not a word about 
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Martineau. To him she obviously didn't exist. Certainly he could have learned 
a lot from the methodical reflections she developed in about 250 pages of her 
book How to Observe Morals and Manners ([1838) 1989). Durkheim's Regles de la 
methode sociologique (trans. [1895) 1982), which is still regarded by the discip-
line as the first fully elaborated and therefore significant sociological work of 
methodical consideration, would probably have been to some extent 
unnecessary. 
There are some assumptions and notions about 'how to observe' any 
society which are shared by Martineau and Durkheim. Let us examine an 
example of this 'intellectual affinity' between Martineau and Durkheim here. 
For instance, Martineau wrote: 
There is no department of inquiry in which it is not full as easy to miss 
truth as to find it, even when the materials from which truth is to be 
drawn are actually present to our senses. A child does not catch a gold 
fish in water at the first trial, however good his eyes may be, and 
however clear the water; knowledge and method are necessary to 
enable him to take what is actually before his eyes and under his 
hand. So is it with all who fish in a strange element for the truth 
which is living and moving there: the powers of observation must be 
trained, and habits of method in arranging the materials presented to 
the eye must be acquired before the student possesses the requisites 
for understanding what he contemplates. 
(Martineau [1838) 1989: 13) 
And 60 years later, we find in Durkheim: 
Thus our rule implies no metaphysical conception, no speculation 
about the innermost depth of being. What it demands is that the 
sociologist should assume the state of mind of physicists, chemists 
and physiologists when they venture into an as yet unexplored area of 
their scientific field. As the sociologist penetrates into the social world 
he should be conscious that he is penetrating into the unknown. He 
must feel himself in the presence of facts governed by laws as yet 
unsuspected as those of life before the science of biology was evolved. 
He must hold himself ready to make discoveries which will surprise 
and disconcert him. 
(Durkheim [1895) 1982: 37-8) 
It may be that the spirit of the time led both to form similar or associated ideas. 
It is fact, however, that Martineau developed and published her thesis a con-
siderable time before Durkheim. 
Martineau's considerations start with the problem of how the evident 
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differences in social life within one society and in different societies can be 
recorded, interpreted and transferred into what we would call today an ethno-
graphically sound description. In her writing, Martineau develops quasi ideal/ 
typical assumptions of a 'good' society, which are used as the benchmarks for 
assessing the level of development of the society being analysed. In this way, 
historical process can be understood as an ascending and, when all is said and 
done, goal-orientated development process: societies pass through various 
stages of civilization, from a 'barbarous state' to an 'enlightened state'. The 
criterion for achievement of this final stage is the extent and distribution of 
'happiness'. For Martineau, the measure of this 'happiness' is the freedom 
within which man can act in a morally responsible manner. Hallmarks of the 
'ideal' society are the fair distribution of material wealth, comprehensive 
public education, the realization of sexual equality, effective and ordered self-
government and a progressive cultural and scientific development. With these 
criteria upon which to measure itself, no society could conceive of reaching 
the end of its developmental life. She therefore questions the consequences of 
the dominant morals and manners in relation to different social practices. If 
there is still inequality despite increasing civilization, through which moral 
ideas and social practice is such inequality legitimized? 
Consequently, she enquires into the nature of social experience. At first 
glance the relationships between people - between men and women, between 
individuals of different social positions or of race - appear to define such 
experience. The way in which these relationships are concretely shaped, how-
ever, is dependent on the prevailing ethical/moral principles and the resultant 
actions and behaviour (manners). This difference between the appearance of a 
social phenomenon and its nature makes it imperative that a well-founded 
research methodology and a method be drawn up; a method which deciphers 
the meaning of a 'social fact' using interpretative processes. 
And how can the 'morals and manners' of any civilization be established? 
This is precisely the question that Martineau aims to explore in her reflections 
on 'how to observe morals and manners'. First, an independent method of 
research and logical enquiry are required. The would-be social researcher must 
undergo three-fold training: intellectual, ethical and practical. 
On the intellectual level, the researcher must acquire an appropriate com-
petence that enables critical reflection on personal impressions and prejudices. 
He or she must be careful to not create prejudice. Martineau sees the main 
obstacle for social progress and human development in the production and 
reproduction of narrow-mindedness regarding foreigners and unknown social 
and cultural habits. Therefore she insists on creating specifically responsible 
ethics, to leave the restrictions of unreflected observations behind. This spe-
cific research ethic - which is also the second stage of training - includes three 
indispensable 'requisites': first, the observer should define the aim of his or her 
observation. She or he must be certain what she or he actually wants to know. 
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Just collecting information by observing the people of a foreign country does 
not really help our understanding of the distinct habits of individuals or the 
cultural and social differences between the nation visited and the traveller's 
country of origin. Coming to the second requisite - finding out the common 
denominator of observations - Martineau is looking for the opportunity 'to 
obtain some useful results. What can be concluded from discovering the vari-
ous ways in which people live together? What judgements can be drawn from 
observation of the divergent circumstances existing in different societies? The 
following quotation illustrates how Martineau examines social practices hy 
taking gender and cultural differences as categories for analysis: 
In the extreme North, there is the snow-hut of the Esquimaux, shin-
ing with the fire within, like an alabaster lamp left burning in a wide 
waste; within the beardless father is mending his weapons made of 
fishbones, while the dwarfed mother swathes her infant in skins, and 
feeds it with oil and fat. In the extreme East, there is the Chinese 
family in their garden, treading its paved walks, or seated under the 
shade of its artificial rocks; the master displaying the claws of his left 
hand as he smokes his pipe, and his wife tottering on her deformed 
feet as she follows her child - exulting over it if it be a boy; grave and 
full of sighs if heaven has sent her none but girls. In the extreme 
South, there is the Colonist of the Cape, lazily basking before his door, 
while he sends his labourer abroad with his bullock-wagon, devolves 
the business of the farm upon the women, and scares from his door 
any poor Hottentot who may have wandered hither over the plain. In 
the extreme West, there is the gathering together on the shores of the 
Pacific of the hunters laden with furs. The men are trading, or 
cleaning their arms, or sleeping; the squaws are cooking, or dyeing 
with vegetable juices the quills of the porcupine or the hair of the 
moose-deer. In the intervals between these extremities, there is a 
world of morals and manners, as diverse as the surface of the lands on 
which they are exhibited. 
(Martineau [1838] 1989: 30f) 
The duty of the responsible traveller now consists of working out the common 
denominator of all observations. What connects and underlies all observable 
manners? Only if he or she figures out this, can he or she be certain of having a 
useful criterion and test for all his or her observations. It is the pursuit of 
happiness that connects all manners. Furthermore, sensitive research 
requires 'a philosophical and definite ... notion about the origin of human 
feelings of right and wrong' (Martineau [1838] 1989: 51). Contradicting the 
popular notion that the 'human feelings of right and wrong' belong to the 
natural make-up of human beings, Martineau insists that these feelings are 
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formed by circumstances. Here she argues with a historical and a cross-cultural 
perspective: 
Now, mankind are, and always have been, so far from agreeing as to 
right and wrong, that it is necessary to account in some manner for 
the wide differences in various ages, and among various nations ... A 
person who takes for granted that there is an universal Moral Sense 
among men ... cannot reasonably explain how it was that those men 
were once esteemed the most virtuous who killed the most enemies in 
battle, while now it is considered far more noble to save life than to 
destroy. They cannot but wonder how it was that it was once thought 
a great shame to live in misery, and an honour to commit suicide; 
while now the wisest and best men think exactly reverse. And, with 
regard to the present age, it must puzzle men who suppose that all 
ought to think alike on moral subjects, that there are parts of the 
world where mothers believe it a duty to drown their children, and 
that eastern potentates openly deride the king of England for having 
only one wife instead of hundred ... We see thatin other cases - with 
regard to science, to art, and to the appearances of nature - feelings 
grow out of knowledge and experience; and there is every evidence 
that it is so with regard to morals. 
(Martineau [1838] 1989: 33ff) 
The third requisite relates to the problem of acknowledgement. Although 
Martineau disputes that there is such a thing as an innate 'human feeling of 
right and wrong', the question of pinpointing the origin of human morals 
remains. Or to put it another way: is there a universal moral value that is also 
central to the idea of justice? And who guarantees this universal moral value? 
In her view it results from a 'gigantic general influence' (Martineau [1838] 
1989: 51) that is to be understood as an external, divine-like system or meta-
physical value. The social observer is obliged to acknowledge this universal 
principle. Even if the fundamental principle is a universal principle, ideas of 
how to achieve it depend on the different social and cultural practices of the 
various societies. All behaviour must be interpreted on the basis of this gener-
ally applicable moral principle. Martineau warns inexperienced researchers 
about the 'observation trap', whereby an action may be considered moral in 
one society but have negative connotations in another. Recognized behaviour 
from one's own society must not be used as a key to the moral basis of 
behaviour in another. All forms of ethnocentrism represent a serious risk for 
those who wish to understand other cultures by observing them. 
On the practical level of research (Martineau [1838] 1989: 232ff), 
Martineau suggests the use of diverse, carefully implemented investigative 
techniques such as making a field diary, recording conversations or copying 
I 
I 
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registers. Having established the conditions necessary for observing in a 'good 
order', Martineau glances at the object of observation: what must be O:bserved 
to gain true ideas about the state of morals and manners in any society? Is it 
necessary to interview men and women? Martineau doesn't think so. Instead, 
she advocates careful collection of social facts: 
The grand secret of wise inquiry into Morals and Manners is to begin 
with the study of things, using the discourse of persons as a commentary 
upon them. Though the facts sought by travellers relate to Persons, 
they may most readily be learned from Things. The eloquenc;e of 
Institutions and Records, in which the action of the nation is 
embodied and perpetuated, is more comprehensive and more faithful 
than that of any variety of individual voices. The voice of a whole 
people goes up in the silent workings of an institution; the condition 
of the masses is reflected from the surface of a record. 
(Martineau 1838a: 73f)2 
Since Martineau sets herself the task of assessing the moral status of soci-
eties as a whole, and since this assessment depends largely on the empirically 
gathered facts (although interpreted in the light of universal principles), the 
quality of the observation data is of vital importance. Martineau repeatedly 
and emphatically makes the point that observations must be representative. 
Bias is to be avoided. All institutionalized specimens must be observed in all 
locations, within all classes, in all areas. Observers must not be influenced by 
the ruling classes and must, at the same time, remain open to opinions and 
insights - a difficult task even for experienced researchers. 
Within this part of her reflections Martineau presents an abundance of 
examples and evidence of how the 'institutions' and 'records' of any nation can 
tell a story about the specific morals and manners. She explores in fields that 
include culture ('religion', 'general moral notions'), economy ('domestic state') 
and politics ('idea of liberty', 'progress'), themes like national identity, 
domestic relations and their consequences for the situation of women, social 
classes, types of religion, normality and deviance, types of suicide and the 
meaning of repressive social institutions. The recording of micro sociological 
phenomena - for example, the differences in the lives of those who live in the 
town and those who live in the country, different eating and drinking cultures, 
cultural habits and tendencies both at home and outside the home, the provi-
sion of commodities, family life, the significance of the dead for the living and 
so on - provides us with information about the macro sociological status of a 
society, that is the ethical constitution of a society. To give an example: 
The traveller everywhere finds woman treated as the inferior party 
in a compact in which both parties have an equal interest. Any 
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agreement thus formed is imperfect, and is liable to disturbance. The 
degree of the degradation of woman is as good a test as the moralist 
can adopt for ascertaining the state of domestic morals in any coun-
try. The Indian squaw carries the household burdens, trudging in the 
dust, while her husband on horseback paces before her, 
unencumbered but by his own gay trappings. She carries the wallet 
with food, the matting for the lodge, the merchandise (if they possess 
any) and her infant. There is no exemption from labour for the squaw 
of the most vaunted chief. In other countries the wife may be found 
drawing the plough, hewing wood and carrying water; the men of the 
family standing idle to witness her toils. Here the observer may feel 
pretty sure of his case. From a condition of slavery like this, women 
are found rising to the highest condition in which they are at present 
seen in France, England and the United States - where they are less 
than half-educated, precluded from earning a subsistence, except in 
a very few ill-paid employments, and prohibited from giving or 
withholding their assent to laws which they are yet bound by penal-
ties to obey. 
(Martineau [1838] 1989: l 78f) 
Martineau's methodological proposals are those of a sophisticated social 
theorist who keenly understands two critical and fundamental principles: 
first, that all observers, irrespective of how carefully they work, make mis-
takes, can read too much into something and can become the victims of 
their own assumptions, and second, that it is in our nature that human 
beings are selective and make interpretations in their intervention in the 
social world. 
'While woman's intellect is confined ... ' - on the position of women 
in the US 
Men are ungentle, tyrannical. They abuse the right of the strongest, 
however they may veil the abuse with indulgence. They want the 
magnanimity to discern woman's human rights; and they crush her 
morals rather than allow them. Women are, as might be anticipated, 
weak, ignorant and subservient, in as far as they exchange self-
reliance for reliance on anything out of themselves. 
(Martineau 1837: 162) 
In Society in America (1837), in which she compared life in North America with 
the theoretical claims of a democratic system, Martineau describes the political 
and legislative institutions in the US, its economy, social norms and cultural 
life. She stresses the differences between agricultural practices in Great Britain 
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and those in the US, concerns herself with the effects of the slave trade on the 
economic system and analyses the position of women. 
In the section on women, Martineau argues that a democracy in which the 
power of the ruling class depends on the consent of those being governed, yet 
one that simultaneously excludes women completely, is absurd. She found 
that although the legal status of women in the US was better than that in 
Europe, their position was basically the same as that of slaves in that they had 
no political voice, their life was heteronomous and they were invisible in pub-
lic life. This exclusion from political reality was camouflaged as gallantry, 
which resulted in destruction of women's individuality. Martineau was a harsh 
judge of 'pro-women' campaigners such as Jefferson in America or John Stuart 
Mill in England. She strongly rejected the view that it would be best if women 
were represented by their protective husbands or fathers. She argued that the 
interests of women and men are not the same and thus could neither be 'dele-
gated' to men nor withheld from women. When comparing the educatio~ of 
women in both England and America, she found similarities in that in both 
countries women were only given a smattering of knowledge and hence 
remained excluded from the professions. The greatest disadvantage to women 
in America was their systematic exclusion from gainful employment. 
Martineau also addressed, in her conclusion, the issue of how such an 
asymmetrical social relationship was established and maintained. She dis-
covered that, essentially, women in America were subjected to a hegemonic 
relationship which, whether they knew it or not, left them scarred. This 
hegemonic relationship is characterized by the dominance of the 'masters' -
legitimized as chivalry - over women. So what happens to women during this 
process? They are swindled out of their individuality and are subject to the 
illusion that they can realize themselves in their exile to the familial and pri-
vate spheres. How did this prevailing ideology of gender become ingrained in 
the minds of women? 
Martineau concludes from her observations that this situation is the out-
come not of an individual, but a structural power/dominance relationship 
where the conditions of socialization seem to be responsible for the subordin-
ate role played by women in gender relationships. In marked contrast to pre-
dominant scientific ideas of the time, Martineau did not see nature as the 
cause of the apparent difference between the sexes. So what were the methods 
of education? Martineau makes a distinction between two forms that are caus-
ally related. There was an official and a sinister syllabus for the education of 
the sexes. The official syllabus, which is addressed relatively early in life, 
determined what boys should learn and what girls should learn, and which 
abilities and skills they should develop. This, in tum, was determined by the 
content of the 'sinister' syllabus for the education of the sexes resulting from 
the 'discipline of circumstance' (Martineau 1837: 157). The content of this 
'sinister syllabus' for women suggested that, as there were no concrete roles for 
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women in public life, women did not need comprehensive education or train-
ing. Martineau draws a direct parallel here between (backward-thinking) 
English education and (supposedly democratic, egalitarian) American educa-
tion. There were abilities and skills that everyone learnt in both countries, the 
essential outcome of which was to maintain women in an inferior position: 
The intellect of woman is confined by an unjustifiable restriction of 
both methods of education - by express teaching, and by the discip-
line of circumstance ... There is a profession of some things being 
taught which are supposed necessary because everybody learns them. 
They serve to fill up time, to occupy attention harmlessly, to improve 
conversation, and to make women something like companions to 
their husbands, and able to teach their children somewhat. But what 
is given is, for the most part, passively received; and what is obtained 
is, chiefly, by means of the memory. There is rarely or never a careful 
ordering of influences for the promotion of clear intellectual activity. 
(Martineau 1837: 157) 
How could women develop as individuals under these circumstances? 
What opportunities and perspectives did they have? Martineau makes the 
point that in the US they could hope for nothing but marriage. An alternative 
to this would be another genuinely female area of work: religion. Martineau 
exposes this apparent option as pure ideology, for in contemplating religious 
questions, women find, at best, a way of passing time and gaining a moral 
education. For Martineau, the 'true' domain of intellectual discussion is not 
religion itself, but the science of religion, or theology. Yet here, as with other 
areas of scientific endeavour, women were denied entry. In this respect, 
women in America (just like their European sisters) were forced back to the 
institution of marriage, for which they were exclusively and systematically 
prepared, and at the same time learnt to act as though they wanted 
nothing more. · 
Martineau concluded that female morals and consciousness, in American 
society too, are suppressed and corrupted. The 'discovery' made during the 
Enlightenment, that all people have the gifts of reason and understanding and 
must responsibly take their place in society, now evidently applies to only part 
of humanity. If gender-specific education fails, in the sense that women are no 
longer content simply to adopt their allocated place in the 'house and home', 
there is a more polished instrument available which is to send them back 
behind their barriers. The public opinion machine pounces on those who 
express subversive political opinions. This repressive ruling apparatus func-
tions superbly. Martineau describes the repressive strategies used on many 
women in her writings on slavery. She concludes that women are 'permitted' 
to act charitably and compassionately, but not politically. 
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Martineau asserts that the division of the relationship between the sexes, 
the allocation of the 'public' sphere to men and 'private' sphere to women, is 
the result of a repressive process of assertion of ownership and dominance. 
This superordinate/subordinate relationship between the sexes is established 
using the vehicles of education and gender politics. What began as a socially 
mediated socialization process has been de-socialized and quasi-naturalized. 
Martineau disputes the prevailing view that there are typically male and typic-
ally female virtues. She does not deny that there are specifically male/female 
capacities for labour, something that cannot be addressed by any researcher 
since people are already social beings. However, it is not scientifically sound to 
conclude from this, anecdotally, that virtues generally considered 'robust' can 
be attributed to men, and that the more gentle virtues can be attributed to 
women. This kind of model does not explain the difference between the sexes, 
but legitimizes what is ultimately a patriarchal relationship. 
When 'founding fathers' were adversaries. 
Jenny P. d'Hericourt and the critique of emerging 
sociological discourse 
Each [political writer] gives himself his own theme; each takes off 
from his own ideas, his own system, and his own theory, and often 
his ideas are prejudices, his system is a novel and his theory a chimera. 
(Comte 1816-28) 
When the French social philosopher Jenny P. d'Hericourt was criticizing con-
temporary social thinkers in journal articles and open letters in the 1850s, it 
was not just her severe comments and her provocative opinions that caused a 
sensation. Just as scandalous was the fact that a woman was meddling in the 
discussion of modern society. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, a writer on political 
economy in whose work both the emergence of a theory of anarchy and 
theorems of early sociology were worked out (Ansart 1967), was one of those 
who picked up the debate with d'Hericourt, only to abruptly break it off again. 
In December 1856, d'Hericourt had published an open letter entitled 'Mister 
Proudhon and the women's question', which contained a severe critique of his 
repeated derogatory remarks regarding the 'natural' lesser value of women and 
the impossibility of an egalitarian societal arrangement between women and 
men. In January 1857, Proudhon informed his critic, also in the form of an 
open letter, that he might well enter into an intellectual debate with her, but 
that she ought to allow herself to be represented by a male 'guardian' (parrain) 
who would sign her articles and take responsibility for everything she said. 
He declared his intention to perform an 'intellectual and moral autopsy' on 
her. In this endeavour he would necessarily have to infringe all the 'rules of 
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propriety' that men are expected to observe for women - and to which he 
personally felt obliged - as Jenny P. d'Hericourt had herself asked him not to 
sacrifice his powers of argument to gallantry. Admittedly she would not like 
this - Proudhon knew his opponent- but this, he wrote, was a disadvantage of 
her position as a woman that she would have to bear bravely. And another 
reason listed by Proudhon that had little to do with propriety yet went to the 
core of the dispute was the fact that by addressing his views to a woman, he 
would be acknowledging her. It would be inconsistent and indeed paradoxical 
to argue for the predominance of the man by entering into debate with a 
woman, Proudhon wrote, anticipating his opponent's comment. D'Hericourt 
could not possibly have imagined, he concluded, that he would fall into this 
trap (Proudhon 1857: 166£). 
Indeed, to have recognized a woman as a partner in debate would have 
meant granting her authority as a speaking subject in a discussion of the social. 
T~is was precisely what Proudhon was so fervently rejecting. In this sense, this 
dispute should not be treated as an isolated incident. Instead, this episode can 
be seen as a paradigmatic expression of what is at stake here: the contested 
foundations of the masculinization of the subject ('the sociologist') and the 
object ('the social') in the debate about modern society at a time at which the 
'incubation period' of sociology was drawing to a close and the actual 'founda-
tion period' of the discipline was about to come into being (Lepenies 1981a: 
IX). Our intention is to show that although this masculinization was asserted 
as self-evi~ent, it was at the same time contested and fragile. Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon s refusal to respond to a woman addressing him demonstrates the 
efforts to impose the social and cognitive identity of a discourse in which 
the_ literal masculinity of the speaker and the metaphorical masculinity of the 
social are mutually reinforcing.3 It is significant that the literal woman 
Jenny P. d'Hericourt, need not be silenced, but must be made to vanish behind 
a literally masculine guardian. This not only illustrates the dependence of the 
metaphorical masculinity of the discourse on the literal masculinity of its 
speaker, but also the dependence of the literal masculinity of the speaker on 
the metaphorical masculinity of the discourse - hence the emotional under-
cur_re~t of Proudhon's reaction to his opponent. More well-disposed, but just 
as 1rntated as Proudhon, the literary critic Jules de Goncourt declared that 
d'Hericourt had 'in her style the omnipotence of the beard' (quoted by Adam 
1904: 55), while others, somewhat less amicably, maintained that she was a 
'rea~o~in~ machine' (quoted by d'Hericourt [1864] 1981: XI). Quite clearly, 
the irntat10n caused by a woman arrogating to herself authorship in the dis-
course on the social can only be nullified by a metaphorical 'defeminization' 
or even 'dehumanization' of the author or by the literal 'masculinization' of 
her words by a 'guardian'. . 
D'Hericourt was, of course, less than impressed by Proudhon's demand 
and steadfastly pursued her critique publicly and under her own name. Her 
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point was precisely to assert a.s a woman the right to shape the discourse: 'Now 
... it belongs to me, a woman, to speak myself on behalf of my rights, without 
leaning on anything but Justice and Reason' (d'Hericourt [1864] 1981: 208). 
This is how she introduces her deliberations on social theory in her book, 
Women Affranchized (1800). The declared aim of this book was not to explain 
society, but 'to prove that woman has the same rights as man' (d'Hericourt 
[1864] 1981: IX). However it was her analysis of the conditions of female exist-
ence in society, as well as her critique of contemporary theories on femininity 
and masculinity, that steered her thinking in genuinely sociological direc-
tions, despite the fact that there were as yet no clear lines of demarcation 
between discussions of 'the social' and those of philosophy, literature or the 
natural sciences. This discourse on 'the social', however, already had a 
'founding father' in the person of Auguste Comte, and it was with Comte that 
d'Hericourt engaged critically. As a preface to d'Hericourt's critique of Comte 
we first recapitulate the author's biography in brief. 
Biography 
Jenny P. d'Hericourt was born in Besan\:on in 1809 as Jeanne-Marie-Fabienne 
Poinsard, daughter of a Protestant and republican couple (see Offen (1987) 
for more on d'Hericourt's biography). The pseudonym 'd'Hericourt' was 
taken for the Lutheran village of the Franche-Comte her father came from 
and stresses her attachment to her religious and political origins. After her 
father's death in 1817, the family moved to Paris. In 1827 d'Hericourt fin-
ished training to be teacher; in 1832 she married the civil servant Michel-
Gabriel-Joseph Marie whom she left four years later. From 1836 on she took 
private lessons in anatomy, physiology and history of nature. In 1852 she did 
a course in midwifery at the Maternite in Paris and subsequently opened a 
consulting room for women and children. Already having placed 'herself on 
the ground which men preserve for themselves' (d'Hericourt quoted in Offen 
1987: 156) by studying natural sciences and practising medicine, she 
encroached further on masculine terrain by intervening in the theoretical 
debate about modem society and the question of women. This wasn't, how-
ever, her first engagement in post-revolutionary social theory and politics. 
Jenny P. d'Hericourt had already some experience as an adherent of the early 
communist movement in the 1840s, having worked with the communist 
Etienne Cabet, writing articles and short stories for his newspaper as well as a 
novel, at the heart of which was an intense social critique. By 1848 she had 
abandoned her commitment to communism, criticizing the lack of consider-
ation of the status of women in the communist movement. She had partici-
pated in the early feminist movement whose demands were ignored by the 
Seconde Republique in 1848 and which was totally repressed by the regime 
of Napoleon III in the 1850s. In these years d'Hericourt became a collabor-
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ator in the Parisian Revue philosophique et religieuse, a liberal and Protestant 
review concerned with social philosophy and politics. In this review she 
wrote critiques of Christianity, several articles on homeopathic medicine, as 
well as critiques of Auguste Comte, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the historian 
Jules Michelet. In 1860 her main work, La femme affranchie. Reponse a MM. 
Michelet, Proudhon, E. de Girardin, A. Comte et am autres novateurs modemes 
(1860) was published and four years later an abridged version was translated 
into English.4 In this book she re-published her articles from the Revue philos-
ophique et religieuse ~d added further critiques of political and social move-
ments and theorists. Furthermore, she developed her own social theory, 
wrote about the social and legal position of women in France and provided a 
programme for a feminist movement as well as an educational programme. 
In 1863 Jenny P. d'Hericourt moved to Chicago, where she worked with the 
American feminist movement until her return to France roughly ten years 
later. She died in 1875 and left some manuscripts that were probably burnt 
after her death. 
Auguste Comte and the female brain: the scientific critique 
Jenny P. d'Hericourt would probably have disagreed with a history of soci-
ology that declares Auguste Comte as a 'founding father' of the discipline. 
Admittedly, she engaged with the 'late' Comte, the Comte who in the last 
decade of his life declared positivism to be a 'religion' and who had, in 
1852, written a Catechisme positiviste ou Sommaire exposition de la religion 
universelle de l'humanite which is not counted as one of the canonical texts, 
even in the history of sociology, but rather is attributed to a pathological 
personality development.5 Yet d'Hericourt, too, distinguishes the Comte of 
the catechism as the promulgator of a 'socio-religious organization' from the 
'rational' Comte of the Cours de philosophie positive and the Systeme de poli-
tique positive (d'Hericourt [1864] 1981: 119) - whose dissemination a critic-
ally informed Martineau had made her own task. D'Hericourt is, however, 
convinced that, while the former Comte was no more than the vulgarizer of 
his teacher, Saint-Simon, the latter Comte was the true, original Comte. And 
the writing of this Comte could not be recommended 'unless in your heart 
and soul you believe yourself deserving of many years of purgatory, which 
you prefer to expiate on the earth' (d'Hericourt [1864] 1981: 119f). It was 
not only Auguste Comte's poor style, which was and continues to be obfus-
catory, that caused readers endless suffering. More importantly for Jenny P. 
d'Hericourt, who had been trained in Enlightenment rationalism and 
Kantian thinking, were 'the clouds and mists of metaphysics' in which 
Comte's thinking enveloped itself and threatened to envelop others 
(d'Hericourt 1855: 47).6 
With typical irony, d'Hericourt seizes on the 'mission' that Comte places 
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on women and translates it into an authorization of her position as an intel-
lectual opponent: 
Being a woman, I am, in Mister Comte's opinion one of the greatest 
representations of the Great Being, a piece of the highest social provi-
dence, a moral providence. With all these titles, I must be heard 
respectfully by the grand priest of humanity. He shall listen to me 
then. 
(D'Hericourt 1855: 55) 
Auguste Comte was, of course, not thinking of theoretical critique when he 
spoke of the unique moral mission of woman, as in his eyes it was by affectiv-
ity, not intellect, that the female character defined itself. And he saw this 
exclusive affective competence as being grounded in the female brain that, for 
its part, did not give women the capacity for intellectual or productive activity. 
From these anatomical 'facts' Comte derived sex-typed functions: women 
belong to family and home where they fulfil their mission in making men 
sociable and moral persons and therefore in providing the necessary condition 
for society. Influenced by female affectivity, men can learn to temper their 
natural tendency to individualize, synonymous with egoism, and to develop 
instead their sociability, synonymous with altruism. Women, while making 
society possible, do not engage in society, defined as it is as the net of inter-
relationships of productive and intellectual men. Hence, women are the 
theoretical matter of 'social statics', while men are the theoretical matter of 
'social dynamics' which constitutes the proper object of the science of 'soci-
ology'. Women therefore are at once charged with the most fundamental prob-
lem of modem society - the guarantee of social integration - and at the same 
time excluded from society. They were supposedly able to exert an imminent 
influence on men while at the same time subjected to patriarchal control by 
men in the family and the state. 
There are reasons associated with the history of science for the proto-
sociological question of the organization of society overlapping with natural-
science argumentation in Comte's anatomical foundation of an order of 
things in this vein. On the one hand, proto-sociological discourse was heavily 
associated with the biological sciences.7 On the other hand, the biological 
sciences themselves were increasingly important as a reference point for the 
elaboration of sexual difference and gender relations which was given impetus 
by the upsurge of the excessively meaningful 'women's special anthropology' 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Honegger 199lb; see also 
Jordanova 1989; Laqueur 1990). D'Hericourt does not deny that there could be 
a relationship between the biological and social conditions of women and 
men. She too has recourse to Comte's expert witnesses on the subject of female 
affectivity and male intellectualism and productivity that phrenology 
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attributed to differentiated brains. Yet natural science thinking does not mis-
lead her into the determinist reductionism for which she rebukes Comte: 
Since you believe in Gall and Spurzheim, you know that the encepha-
lon of the two sexes is alike, that it is modifiable in both, that all 
education is founded on this modificability; why has it never 
occurred to you that if man en masse is more rational than woman, it 
is because education, laws and custom have developed in him the 
anterior lobes of the brain; while in woman, education, laws, and 
custom develop especially the posterior lobes of this organ; and why, 
having established these facts, have you not been led to conclude 
that, since organs are developed only in consequence of the excitants 
applied to them, it is probable that man and woman, subjected to the 
same cerebral excitants, would be developed in the same manner, 
with the shades of difference peculiar to each individuality; and that 
for woman to be developed harmoniously under her three aspects, 
she must manifest herself socially under three aspects? Be sure, sir, 
your principle is thrice false, thrice in contradiction to science and 
reason; in the presence of the physiology of the brain, all theories of 
classification fall to the ground: before the nervous system, women 
are the equals of men: they can be their inferiors only before muscular 
supremacy, attacked by the invention of powder, and about to be 
reduced to dust by the triumph of mechanism. · 
(D'Hericourt [1864] 1981: 132f) 
D'Hericourt first denies any causal-deterministic relation between a fixed 
brain structure on the one hand and sex-typed functions and a corresponding 
social structure on the other hand. Against this sort of reductionism, she uses 
a scientific argument for a sociological consideration of sexual differences and 
gender relations. She argues that all human organs, including the brain, are 
modifiable and by that modifiability humans get a 'second nature' by habitu-
alization specific to the social milieu and the educational influence. Hence, 
d'Hericourt insisted on the social, cultural and historical dimension of differ-
ences between women and men: if women were indeed less rational and 
more affective than men, this was an effect of societal organization and cul-
tural customs and therefore subject to historical change. For d'Hericourt there 
is a comprehensive potential in all humans, independent of their sex, and 
unbalanced development of this potential leads to a perversion of human 
nature: 
But you, who wish to annihilate woman, from what principle do you 
draw such a consequence? That she is an affective power, you say ... 
yes, but, as to that, man is such, likewise; and is not woman, as well 
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as he, alike intellect and activity? By reason of a purely accidental 
predominance, can one half of the human species be banished 
beyond the clouds of sentimentality? And ought not all serious dis-
cipline to tend to develop, not one phase of the being, but the pon-
deration, the harmony of all its phases? Want of harmony is the 
source of disorder and deformity. The woman who is solely senti-
mental commits irreparable errors; the man who is solely rational is a 
species of monster, and the person in whom activity predominates is 
but a brute. 
(D'Hericourt [1864] 1981: 132) 
From this perspective, far from proving a natural difference and natural 
inequality between women and men, phrenology instead reveals a natural 
equality of all human beings. As in a truly modem society where everyone is 
equal before the law - the allusion is evident - everyone is 'equal before the 
nervous system'. To follow d'Hericourt' s own reasoning: since everyone is 
equal before the nervous system, everyone is equal in society and there is no 
scientific justification possible for the confinement of women to affective 
functions and their subordination under the political control of men. Comte's 
scientific reasoning was revealed as nothing other than a political option 
which d'Hericourt called unmistakably the 'social annihilation' of women 
(d'Hericourt [1864] 1981: 69, 132). 
Theories of classification: the epistemological critique 
Since Comte's and others' outlines of a social theory were operating with 
underlying theories of sexual difference, d'Hericourt added to her scientific 
critique an epistemological critique which resulted in what may tentatively be 
called an 'agnosticism' towards every attempt to theorize sexual difference. 
Her starting point was that all existing definitions of maleness and femaleness 
didn't match the heterogeneity of social reality: 'Men, and women after them, 
have deemed it proper hitherto to class man and woman separately; to define 
each type, and to deduce from this ideal the functions suited to each sex. 
Neither has chosen to see that numerous facts contradict this classification' 
(D'Hericourt [1864] 1981: 225). D'Hericourt didn't deny the existence of a pre-
social sexual difference; she was even convinced that biological differences 
between the sexes relate to an ontological difference. However, this onto-
logical difference could be neither described nor theorized: 
We do not give a classification, because we neither have nor can have 
one; the elements for its establishment are lacking. A biological 
deduction permits us to affirm that such a one exists; but it is impos-
sible to disengage its law in the present surroundings; the veritable 
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feminine stamp will be known only after one or two centuries of like 
education and equal rights. 
(D'Hericourt [1864] 1981: 243f) 
Therefore, a social theory that claims the naturalness of differences result-
ing from socialization and prescribed social positions mistakes for pre-social 
sexual difference what in fact is an effect of power relations and the will to 
tame heterogeneity:8 'Ah no, gentlemen, these are not men and women; they 
are the deplorable results of your selfishness, of your frightful spirit of domin-
ation, of your imbecility ... ' (d'Hericourt [1864] 1981: 245). Since the existing 
differences between women and men are social and not ontological facts, 
these differences cannot in any way be a legitimation for sex-typed social 
functions and political inequality, and neither can they be legitimized by 
an appeal to ontological difference that must be assumed but at present cannot 
be known. 
If the ontological difference between the sexes could be recognized when 
- and only when - the social influence is precisely determined, then know-
ledge of the difference between the sexes itself remains, at best, doubtful and 
purely speculative. The essence behind the phenomenon of the difference 
between the sexes is fundamentally beyond human knowledge and the 
methods of the scientific view: 'Our reason can only recognise the phenomena 
and their laws, but not the essence of things or their ultimate causes. These do 
not belong to the domain of science' (D'Hericourt 1860: vol. II, p. 253). The 
reality beyond its manifest phenomenon can never be adequately represented 
by knowledge, because knowledge always organizes itself in categories, which 
abstract from the variety of social reality. These categories systematize and 
classify reality, but do not coincide with it. Since objective reality is only mani-
fest in the appearance, the abstracts of 'femininity' or 'masculinity' exist only 
as qualities of a female or male individual. If the category of 'sex' is only 
conceivable through abstraction from the individuality of all women and men 
and, at the same time, the quality of 'sex' is only realized in the individual 
being, then neither does the individuality dissolve in membership of a sex, nor 
is the sexual identity suspended in individual being: 'There are as many differ-
ent men as there are male individuals, as many different women as female 
individuals' (D'Hericourt 1860: vol. II, p. 114). And this also means that once 
centuries of non-sex-typed education and social organization have passed, any 
reason for classification of humanity into women and men will become 
superfluous: 'then there will be no need of a classification, for the function will 
fall naturally to the proper functionary under a system of equality in which the 
social elements classify themselves' (d'Hericourt [1864] 1981: 243f). 
D'Hericourt argues from a position between biological determinism and 
social constructivism and thus within those epistemological parameters in 
which the modem debate over the difference between the sexes and sexual 
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relations is caught. Given, however, that neither of these two perspectives 
admit a primacy of knowledge of the difference between the sexes, she argues 
against reductionisms of any kind and opts for an ontologically agnostic atti-
tude. Thus she wrenches the phenomenon of the differences between the 
sexes from the grip of the biologists, and opens it up to a genuinely socio-
logical analysis. In this way she extends the reach of sociological consideration 
of society and the modern. She asserts, again in opposition to Comte and the 
contemporary hegemonic thinking regarding the difference between the 
sexes, the possibility and facticity of female individuality that in the context of 
modern social theories also means the possibility and facticity of female 
capacities to associate in modern society.9 
Beyond masculinity: the empirical critique and fragments of a theory of 
modern society 
If Auguste Comte positioned his desk vis-a-vis a mirror and 'was always look-
ing at himself' when he wrote (Lepenies 1988: 46), then d'Hericourt must have 
worked at an open window. Her thinking was shot through with a clear and 
unwavering sense of social reality, which anchored her theoretical activity. 
She criticized Comte's theory precisely because it ignored the reach of 
empirically observable social change. 'They say, gentleman, that you don't 
read anymore, and I could convince myself of that fact, since it seems that you 
don't know a word about the mental and material state of the different elem-
ents of our French society, especially in what concerns my sex' (d'Hericourt 
1855: 59). For woman, d'Hericourt claimed, 'is no longer confined to the care 
of children and household, but instead she is engaged more and more in the 
production of national and individual welfare' (d'Hericourt 1860: vol. II, 
p. 273). 
Yet this factual 'integration' of women into the labour market was paral-
leled by her exclusion of civil and political rights, by her subordination under 
patriarchal control in the state and in marriage, and this, d'Hericourt was 
convinced, revealed an imminent social pathology. Woman must be man's 
equal in every aspect of social life, 'because the progress of Enlightenment, in 
which woman participates, has transformed her in social power, and because 
this new power produces evil in default of the good which it is not permitted 
to do' (d'Hericourt [1864] 1981: X). Therefore the emancipation of woman is 
not only the political imperative of an enlightened society that claims to con-
stitute itself as a just one, but also a social necessity. 
Implicitly, d'Hericourt's reasoning relates to the problem which was of 
most intense concern to pre-sociological discourse and through which this 
discourse gained its specificity that should lead to the emergence of the socio-
logical discipline: the question of how social order is possible (Luhmann 1996: 
21). It was her claim for female individuality which led d'Hericourt to face this 
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problem more radically than Comte did, while her critique revealed that her 
adversary's theorizing of female and male functions was far more than an 
ephemeral issue of his sociology. Auguste Comte saw a modern society that 
was founded on the division of labour, as constantly menaced by an excess of 
(male) individualization through specialization that would inescapably lead to 
disintegration. His theoretical construction of egoistic, individualized man 
tending to disintegration, and altruistic, non-individualized woman as the 
bulwark against such disintegration was therefore intricately woven into his 
answer to the question of social order in a modern society. This radical and 
essential dualism of women's and men's functional positions in society was, 
for Comte, nothing less than an indispensable condition of social integration. 
For d'Hericourt, what was fundamentally wrong in this theory - besides 
the mistaken ontology of sexual difference - was Comte's idea of (male) indi-
vidualism leading genuinely to disintegration if it was not tamed by (female) 
altruism: 
To live for others, this is the basis of your moral. My answer to you is: 
this moral is false and unjust; false because it does not take account of 
the two elements of any moral code: the individual and society; 
unjust because if it is bad for the collective to be absorbed by the 
individual it is no less so for the individual to be absorbed by the 
collective. 
(D'Hericourt 1855: 57) 
Comte's reduction of the individual to social benefit seemed to d'Heri-
court to be just as incorrect as the utilitarian reduction of society to its benefit 
for the individual against which Comte argued. In trying to overcome both 
these errors, d'Hericourt confronted a problem that would become, some dec-
ades later, the main concern of Emile Durkheim, disciple of d'Hericourt's close 
friend Charles Renouvier. This is the problem of the compatibility of a 'regu-
lated social order with individual freedom and personal autonomy' (Muller 
and Schmid 1996: 481) and is at the root of attempts to theorize the 
relationship between the individual and society in a non-reductive way 
(Luhmann 1996: 31).10 In grappling with this problematic, d'Hericourt was 
developing the outlines of a concept of integration in modern. society that 
Durkheim was to make a milestone of sociological theorizing through his 
elaboration of the concept of 'organic solidarity'. For Durkheim, the division 
of labour is the source of organic solidarity that, in contrast to mechanical 
solidarity, integrates not the equal but the unequal into a social body. Organic 
solidarity presupposes that individuals differ from one another and only 
becomes possible 'when each has his completely autonomous field of activity, 
when he thus has a personality' (Durkheim [1893] 1996: 183). The more div-
ided the labour and the more personal the activities are, according to 
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Durkheim's thesis, the stronger the social coherence. D'Hericourt had used a 
similar formulation around 30 years earlier: 
You should not forget that reason and science prove to you that every-
thing is composed, consequently has an extent, iS> divisible, limited and 
relational, that diversity is the condition of unity and that a being is the 
more perfect the more it is composed of diversity 
(D'Hericourt 1860: vol. II, p. 253) 
Applied to society, this means that social cohesion grows proportionally with 
the degree of social differentiation - social order demands a 'variety of capabil-
ities that are too diverse for any single one of us to be able to combine them 
within ourselves' (d'Hericourt 1860: vol. II, p. 14). D'Hericourt sees the condi-
tions of this development in industrial and scientific progress which increas-
ingly differentiates all productive activities and in which women participate. 
Since she did not make a distinction between the female and the male 
potential for individualization and the corresponding right to specialized 
activity and an individualized existence, d'Hericourt was compelled to think 
through the problematic of social order in a modern society more radically and 
the question of the relationship of individual and society more fundamentally 
than was Comte, precisely because she included women. And unlike 
d'Hericourt, Durkheim would not derive the concept of organic solidarity 
from personal potential and the right of each individual to develop his indi-
viduality, but from the sexual division of labour as the first and original form 
of social differentiation. Durkheim also believed - and in this he was not too 
far away from Comte - that he could get around the risk of social disintegra-
tion with a progressive differentiation of the sexes (Durkheim [1933] 1964; 
Lehmann 1991; Roth 1992; Chapter 1, this volume). And in an unbroken 
tradition, he was to draw on Gustave le Bon's phrenology to support this line 
of reasoning. D'Hericourt, meanwhile, relied in a theoretically more rigorous 
fashion on the integrative effects of an individualization that also breaks 
through the difference between the sexes. When solidarity comes about as a 
result of people being reliant on each other because of their differing capabil-
ities, only the free development of all individuals, including women, can 
create social cohesion. Here she was not only adding a social-theoretical argu-
ment to the philosophical reasoning within feminist discourse, but also liber-
ating proto-sociological discourse from the restrictions of a speculative and 
hierarchical ontology of sexual difference. 
While modernity for us may be marked by masculine individualism, gen-
der dualism and the exclusion of women, for d'Hericourt it was a still 
unfulfilled promise of a non-gender-divided society. Being confronted with 
social theories that deprived women of equality by denying their individuality 
in the putative interest of social integration, she opted for individualization as 
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at once a liberating and integrating force. Aware of the possible disintegrating 
effects of individualization, she conceived the relationship between individual 
and society as a non-reductive one. This was her alternative to Comte's system 
where women provided the moral 'sealing agent' of society and it led her to 
formulate what has since become the core problematic of modern sociology: 
the necessarily complex relation between the individual and society, or 
between agency and structure. 
Since the French Revolution, the question of the social position of woman 
was integral to the question of interpreting and organizing the post-
revolutionary social (Fraisse 1992: 49). That women appear in the 'classical' 
canon of sociology as the 'other' of the social is not to be ascribed to 
the forgetfulness of the classics, but has a systematic reason behind it. 
D'Hericourt's critique demonstrates that it is not the much cited 'blind spots' 
that caused the 'disappearance' of women from the discourse of sociology so 
bitterly resented by feminist scholars in the twentieth century. Instead the 
disappearance of women from the social is revealed by d'Hericourt as a delib-
erate 'social annihilation' of women. And this annihilation was constitutive of 
a sociological discourse that conceptualized society as a 'code word for the 
interests and needs of men' (Sydie 1987: 46; see also Marshall 1994). It was 
d'Hericourt's critique of precisely this masculinist coding of society and social 
theory which led her for her part to pose the question of the possibility of 
social order in a society of individuals in a manner that opens this question up 
as a distinctly sociological problematic. This gains her a place between Comte 
and Durkheim in terms of the history of sociological theory. 
Annihilated: the contested foundations of a discipline 
A theory can be considered as a classical one when, as Luhmann argues, it 
poses a problem that continues as an open but essential question while the 
form in which this problem is expressed varies with the historical context 
(Luhmann 1996: 19£). As we have demonstrated in this chapter, both 
Martineau and d'Hericourt must surely qualify as sociological classics from 
this perspective - Martineau in respect of her methodological ideas, 
d'Hericourt in respect of her social-theoretical thinking, and both together in 
respect of their genuinely sociological thinking about the social construction 
of the differences between the sexes and the relationships between the sexes. 11 
The fact that they do not occupy a canonical position is a demonstration 
of the stubborn inertia of the masculinity of both the subject and the theor-
etical object of sociology. The 'social annihilation' of women was not only 
successfully secured within the now canonized classics of sociological dis-
course, which knows no female sociologists and codes the social as masculine, 
but has also made its indelible mark on the historical identity of the discipline, 
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which does not include feminist critique of early theories of society in its 
tradition. Hence it is not only the 'social annihilation' of women as possible 
subjects and objects of the discourse on the social, but also the 'historical 
annihilation' of the contested foundations of a masculinized sociology, that 
belongs to the history of the 'disciplining' of sociology. 
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Notes 
1 The following biographical details are mainly taken from Harriet Martineau's 
three-volume autobiography (1877), as well as from other sources 
(Clarke 1877; Katscher 1884; Bosanquet 1927; Pichanick 1980; Hill 1989; 
Hoecker-Drysdale 1992). 
2 Durkheim follows Martineau in his Rules of Sociological Method ([1895] 1982) -
sure enough without referring to her - in observing social facts as things. Yet 
Martineau went further than Durkheim, considering also the discourse of per-
. sons as an empirical data of social facts, while Durkheim used mainly stat-
istical data to figure out social facts. Her suggestion leads to an empirical 
method that- as we would say today - could collect, measure and interpret the 
social world combining quantitative and qualitative research. 
3 On the difference between virtual configurations of masculine/feminine and 
institutional configurations of men and women, see Chapter 1 (this volume). 
4 Quotations from La femme af(ranchie by Jenny d'Hericourt (1860) are generally 
taken from the English translation dated [1864] 1981. Some of the citations 
used, however, are not to be found in the heavily abridged English version, 
and these parts are taken from the French original. 
5 For a general review of Comte, see Pickering (1993); with regard to the inter-
relationship between Comte's biography and his work from the perspective of 
constructing male/female identity, see Kofman (1978). 
6 Hence it is not just contemporary feminists who deplore the metaphysical 
saturation of the meaning of woman in the sociological tradition (see Witz 
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2001; Chapter 1, this volume), but also feminist intellectuals of the period (see 
also Chapter 3, this volume). 
7 See also Lepenies (1981b, 1988); on Comte's reception of biology, see 
Canguilhem (1981), McLaren (1981) and Vernon (1986). 
8 And this, d'Hericourt states, is the case whenever social or cultural differences 
are reified by theory, 'whether in castes, in classes, or in sexes' (d'Hericourt 
[1864] 1981: 244). 
9 For an analysis of French feminist discourse in the nineteenth century with 
relation to the discourse of individuality, see Scott (1996). 
10 Practically nothing is known of the line from d'Hericourt through Renouvier 
to Durkheim. The' possibility that Durkheim was aware of d'Hericourt's writing 
cannot, in any event, be excluded. 
11 For a collection of portraits of 'female sociological classics' from a perspective 
of deconstructing and reconstructing the sociological tradition, see Honegger 
and Wobbe (1998). 
